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Abstract 
 
This paper explores how a perceived tax burden is influenced by the degree that 
neighbors prefer income redistribution. Further, this paper investigates how the 
influence of neighbors is affected by the degree of interaction between neighbors. 
For these purposes, individual-level data and place of residence data were combined. 
After controlling for individual characteristics, I obtained the following key 
findings: people are more likely to perceive the amount of tax as low when neighbors 
are more likely to support redistribution policies. Further, this neighbor effect 
increases when community participation rates are high. This tendency is clearly 
observed in high-income groups but not in low-income groups. This implies that the 
norm for redistribution leads rich people to consider the tax burden as low. Further, 
the effect of the norm increases when there is a greater accumulation of social 
capital within a residential area. That is, one’s perceived tax burden is influenced 
by psychological externalities. 
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1. Introduction  
 
A critical issue for policy-makers is how to deter tax evasion. Income 
redistribution through tax collection increases the welfare of the poor, while 
decreasing that of the wealthy. The wealthy are liable to pay tax that finances 
public spending. Inevitably, the wealthy have a greater incentive to evade tax than 
the poor, reducing public spending. In addition, “a preference for public spending 
increases to be funded for additional taxes for which they were not liable. 
Consistently, there is evidence of greater demand for public spending if this is 
financed out of taxes paid by others” (Gemmell et al., 2003, 811). Therefore, the poor, 
who are less likely to be liable for tax payments, support increases in public 
spending via tax burdens on the wealthy. From this we can derive an inference that 
rich people perceive a greater tax burden if they act in their own self-interest.  
In addition to self-interest, the role played by social values is considered to be a 
key factor in the realization of a welfare state and enhancing redistributive policy 
(e.g., Gordon 1989; Luttmer 2001; Klor and Shayo, 2010). 2  For instance, a 
redistributive policy’s effectiveness seems to depend on religion (Chang 2010) and 
culture (Luttmer and Singhal 2011). Preference for redistribution can be analyzed 
from the viewpoint of fairness (e.g., Galasso 2003; Alesina and Angeletos 2005; 
Tyran and Sausgruber 2006; Rainer and Siedler 2008; Luttens and Valfort 2011). 
Altruism can give rich people an incentive to redistribute their wealth to poorer 
people (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Fong 2001). This seems to reduce the perceived tax 
burden for rich people. In this case, rich people do not perceive tax as high even 
when they are liable for progressive tax. Norms possibly lead people to behave 
altruistically even when they are actually selfish (Becker 1996). A number of 
workplaces took into account the role of norms to analyze individuals’ behavior 
concerning tax (e.g., Alm et al., 1999; Wenzel 2004; 2005 a; 2005b; Balestrino 2010; 
Cullis et al., 2012). It seems plausible that the norm for redistribution is formed 
within a community when community members prefer income redistribution. On 
the assumption that the psychological cost to deviate from ‘proper behavior ’ or 
                                                   
2 Trust, a key social value, is observed to be important when tax systems are considered. 
Generalized trust leads people to pay tax (Scholz and Lubell 1998). Further, trust in 
institutions such as government, the legal system, public officials and politics is thought 
to be important to establish tax morale and deter tax evasion (Scholz and Pinney 1995; 
Torgler 2003; Hammar et al., 2009), and such trust induces people to prefer the welfare 
state (Algan et al., 2012). Hence, the size of the welfare state is determined in part by 
social trust (Bergh and Bjørnskov, 2011). 
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‘proper perception’ is sufficiently high, the norm for redistribution leads rich people 
to perceive their tax burden as low even if individuals’ act in their own self-interest.  
In addition to that norm, it has been recently found that people are likely to 
prefer redistribution policies in areas where social capital is sufficiently 
accumulated through frequent contact among neighbors (Yamamura 2012). This 
suggests that an externality via neighboring poor people increases social pressure 
on rich people, which leads rich people to prefer redistribution.3 However, the 
degree of such an externality and social pressure seems to depend on the norm. 
Assuming that neighbors do not prefer redistribution, rich people are unlikely to be 
an object of envy even if there are close interpersonal relations between neighbors. 
There is another possibility that neighbors’ preferences for redistribution are less 
likely to result in a psychological cost for rich people if community members do not 
have contact with each other. If these hold true, the relation between the norm for 
redistribution and community participation is considered to be complementary. 
From this I infer that the effect of the norm regarding perceptions about tax seems 
to depend on social capital, which is regarded as the strength of personal networks 
within a community (Putnam, 2000).4 However, previous research ascertaining the 
determinants of perceptions about tax did not consider the effect of norms and social 
capital (Cuccia and Carnes 2001; Gemmel et al., 2003; 2004; Feld and Larsen 2012). 
The aim of this paper is to assess the effect of norms on perceptions of tax for rich 
people and then how the interactions between norms and social capital influence 
that perception. 
To this end, this paper attempts to compare the effect of the norm for the 
redistribution on the perceived tax burden between poor and rich groups using 
Japanese General Social Surveys (JGSS), which includes more than 10,000 
observations. I found that people are more inclined to perceive tax as low in areas 
where residents are more likely to prefer redistribution policies. The effect of 
residents is greater when neighbors are actively involved in community activities. 
These tendencies were observed only for people from high-income groups and not for 
people in low-income groups.  
                                                   
3 An individual’s life satisfaction is influenced by the characteristics of their neighbors 
(Shields et al. 2008). Neighbors with higher education levels enhance university 
participation for middle class students, resulting in human capital accumulation (Foley 
2012). 
4 Social capital influences not only individuals’ perceptions but also their productivity. 
For instance, social capital and neighbors’ characteristics are found to be key 
determinants regarding the earnings of microfinance borrowers (Gomez and Santor 
2001).  
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the testable 
hypotheses are presented. Section 3 provides an explanation regarding data and the 
empirical method used. Section 4 presents the estimation results and their 
interpretation. The final section offers some conclusions. 
 
2. Hypotheses 
 
According to Becker (1996), norms are defined as “those common values of a 
group which influence an individual’s behavior through being internalized as 
preferences” (Becker 1996, 225). Norms play an important role in deterring 
opportunistic behavior such as tax evasion. The reason is that “if a person does not 
free-ride at the expense of others when that is advantageous to him, it may be 
because norms against the behavior lower the utility from the free-riding” (Becker 
1996, 225). Social interaction is defined in terms of a consumption externality or as 
the utility function of a person to include the reactions of others in his/her actions 
(Becker 1974). Social interaction induces people to obey the norm. That is, “the 
enforcement of norms typically depends on negative reactions by peers toward 
individuals who deviate from ‘proper’ behavior” (Becker 1996, 229).5  Take an 
example of punishment for violating a norm, those who act against the norm suffer 
social ostracism. That is, there is a psychological cost to violating a norm that 
defines ‘proper ’ behavior’.  
The influence of a norm on individuals’ utility differs according to the income 
group the individuals belong to (Becker 1996, Chapter 11). Income tax is progressive 
in Japan and so the rate of tax for rich people is higher than poor people. That is, for 
rich people, the benefit of public goods is more likely to be smaller than their tax 
burden. However, rich people can be sufficiently compensated for any reduction in 
utility when they pay tax because of the incorporation of the norm for redistribution 
in their preferences. Therefore, even for rich people, a tax burden is considered 
relatively low when there is a norm that people should support redistribution. 
Accordingly, I advance Hypothesis 1: 
 
Hypothesis 1  
The norm for redistribution leads rich people to perceive the tax burden as low. 
                                                   
5 An experimental analysis found that the “minority of fair-minded players can force a 
big majority of selfish players to cooperate fully in the public goods game with 
punishment” (Fehr and Schmidt 1999, 856). 
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The effect of the norm seems to depend on the degree of social interaction. 
Further, the more people integrated into social relations, the greater the influence 
of the social interaction. This is because various benefits come from these 
relationships rather than market transactions. Once people are excluded from a 
strong relationship (such as interpersonal network formed in community), they lose 
the long-term benefit of the network (Hayami 2001). Rich people therefore agree to 
obey the norm in return for a sufficiently large long-term benefit from the 
community network. Frequency of contact with neighbors is considered as a type of 
social capital (Putnam, 2000) and seems to reflect the degree of integration into the 
social relation. Hence, the cost to violate the norm is greater for residents in areas 
with a greater accumulation of social capital. In other words, peer ‘pressure’ lowers 
rich people’s marginal disutility to absorb the norm and therefore to pay progressive 
tax. This leads me to propose Hypothesis 2: 
 
Hypothesis 2  
The effect of the norm for redistribution on the perceptions of rich people is greater 
when they live in an area where residents are more likely to interact with each 
other. 
 
3. Data and Methods 
 
3.1. Data 
In this paper, I used JGSS data, which are individual-level data.6 In JGSS 
surveys, a two-stage stratified sampling method is used. The surveys have been 
conducted in Japan since 2000. In this paper, the dataset covered 2000, 2001, 2002, 
2003, 2005, 2006, and 2008.7 JGSS was designed as a Japanese counterpart to the 
General Social Survey (GSS) from the United States. To this end, JGSS asks 
standard questions regarding individuals’ characteristics via face-to-face interviews. 
The data includes information about perceived income tax burden, opinions 
regarding income redistribution policies, marital and demographic (age and gender) 
                                                   
6Data for this secondary analysis, “Japanese General Social Surveys (JGSS), Ichiro 
Tanioka,” was provided by the Social Science Japan Data Archive, Information Center 
for Social Science Research on Japan, Institute of Social Science, the University of 
Tokyo. 
7Surveys were not conducted in 2004 and 2007. Surveys were conducted in 2009 and 
2010 but the data is not available.  
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status, annual household income,8 years of schooling, prefecture of residence, and 
prefecture of residence at 15 years old. A Japanese prefecture is the equivalent to a 
state in the United States or a province in Canada. There are 47 prefectures in 
Japan, and the average values for the variables included in the JGSS can be 
calculated for each prefecture. These average values reflect the characteristics of 
each prefecture.  
Data were collected from 22,796 adults, aged between 20 and 89 years. 
Respondents did not answer all of the survey questions; therefore, data regarding 
some variables are not available, and the number of samples used in the regression 
estimations is reduced to 7,794. In comparison with international data, the use of 
JGSS data in this paper has the advantage that “within country analysis is much 
less likely to be subject to measurement error due to changes in institutional 
structures of redistributive policies” (Alesina and Giuliano 2009, 22).  
The variables used in the regression estimations are shown in Table 1, which 
provides definitions, means, standard deviations, maximum values, and minimum 
values. The key dependent variable is TAX (index of the perceived income tax 
burden). The JGSS asked the following question: “Do you think the amount of 
income tax you have to pay is high?” There were five response options: “1 (too low)”, 
“2 (somewhat low)”, “3 (about right)” “4 (somewhat high)”, and “5 (too high)”. TAX is 
the response options chosen by the respondents. The distribution of TAX is shown in 
Figure 1—it shows that most people considered tax as “somewhat high” or “too 
high”.  
The regional characteristics used in this paper are SC, NORM, and AVINCOM. 
The utility of people is considered to be influenced not only by one’s own income but 
also by the income level of neighbors (e.g., Clark and Oswald, 1996; Neumark and 
Postlewaite, 1998; McBride, 2001; Stutzer 2004). In other words, not only absolute 
income but also relative income is considered related to an individual’s utility and, 
therefore, perceptions. This paper controls for both individual-level household 
income and average household income within residential prefectures to capture the 
relative income effect. For this purpose, in addition to respondents’ household 
incomes, the income level of residential areas are taken into account. I used JGSS 
data to calculate the average household income within a prefecture (AVINCOM). 
                                                   
8In the original dataset, annual earnings were grouped into 19 categories, and it was 
assumed that everyone in each category earned the midpoint value. For the top category 
of “23 million yen and above,” I assumed that everybody earned 23 million yen. Of the 
7,794 observations used in the regression estimations, there were only 98 observations 
in this category. Therefore, the problem of top-coding should not be an issue here. 
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With respect to individual characteristics, INCOME, AGE, MARRY, SCHOOL, 
UNEMP, MALE, PROG_2, PROG3, PROG_4 and PROG_5 are used. Data for these 
variables can be obtained from the JGSS. The proxy for individuals’ political 
ideology is constructed, based on responses to the JGSS question, “Where would you 
place your political views on a five-point scale?” There are five response options: “1 
(conservative)” to “5 (progressive)”. The placement of political views is captured by 
dummies: PROG_5 takes the value of 1 when the response is “5”, otherwise 0. 
PROG_1, PROG_2, PROG_3, and PROG_4 are defined in a similar manner.  
 
3.2. Definitions of social norm and social capital  
Previous research has distinguished personal norms and social norms and 
scrutinized their effects when perceptions and attitudes regarding tax were 
analyzed (Wenzel, 2004; 2005a). However, in these studies social norms were 
measured in terms of individual perceptions regarding the social norm, based on the 
following questions: “Do MOST PEOPLE think they should honestly declare cash 
earnings on their tax return?” and “Do MOST PEOPLE think working for 
cash-in-hand payments without paying tax is a trivial offence?” (Wenzel, 2004, 220). 
This index is considered as a subjective evaluation rather than objective one. Hence, 
this measure of social norms is regarded as an endogenous variable. Endogeneity 
bias seems to occur when tax perception is a dependent variable and the measure of 
social norms is included as an independent variable. To avoid this problem, in this 
paper, the social norm is measured as the average rate of those who prefer 
redistribution policies within the area that the respondent resides. The JGSS 
included a question concerning preferences for redistribution: “It is the 
responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between 
families with high incomes and those with low incomes.” There were five response 
options, ranging from “1 (strongly disagree)” to “5 (strongly agree)”. In this paper, 
the average value of the responses within a residential prefecture is defined as the 
norm for redistribution shared by neighbors.  
 In this research, and in line with Putnam (2000), the degree of participation in 
community activities is defined as social capital.9 The influence of neighbors is 
considered to be greater when people participate in community activities. That is, 
                                                   
9 Social capital is defined as the features of a social organization such as networks and 
norms, as well as social trust facilitating coordination and cooperation (Putnam 2000). 
Hence, social capital can be interpreted in various ways, thereby causing ambiguity and 
criticism regarding its measurement and definition (e.g., Paldam 2000; Sobel 2002; 
Durlauf 2002; Bjørnskov 2006). 
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the effect of the norm on the perception of individuals is greater when they live in 
areas with higher levels of community involvement. In 1996, the Japan 
Broadcasting Corporation conducted a survey on the consciousness and behaviors of 
prefecture residents (Japan Broadcasting Corporation 1997). This survey included a 
question about the degree of community activity involvement: “Do you actively 
participate in community activities?” Respondents could choose one of three 
responses: “yes”, “unsure”, or “no”. I calculated the rates for those who answered 
“yes” within a prefecture, and used this value as a measure of social capital. I also 
assumed that the rate of participation in community activities was stable over time. 
As mentioned earlier, there are 47 prefectures, and I obtained a proxy for each 
prefecture.  
In this paper, as an objective category, high-income earners are defined as those 
with a household income higher than 6 million yen. The remainder of the residents 
are defined as low-income earners. However, as demonstrated in Figure 2, the shape 
of distribution of household income is not clearly divided at 6 million yen. Inevitably, 
this category is arbitrarily determined. To put it differently, those who belong to the 
5 million yen group can also be considered as high-income earners although the 
category of this paper defined them as low-income earners. It is difficult to clearly 
divide respondents into two groups because “middle-income earners” can be 
considered to belong not only to the high-income group but also to the low-income 
group. To reduce any ambiguity regarding categorization, and following Derin-Güre 
and Uler (2010), an alternative category of income groups is suggested. The JGSS 
asked: “Compared with Japanese families in general, what would you say about 
your family income?” There were five response options: “Far below average”, “Below 
average”, “Average”, “Above average” and “Far above average”. Figure 3 
demonstrates that the share of the “average” group is greatest and that there is now 
a clearer difference between high- and low-income groups than in Figure 2. In 
addition to the objective category, an alternative subjective category is made based 
on the responses to the question. In the subjective category, those who belong to the 
high-(low)income group are defined as those who considered themselves above 
(below) or far above (below) average income earners. In the alternative measure, 
those responded “average” are excluded from the sample. 
Table 2 shows the comparison of key variables between high-income and low- 
income groups, which is based on the objective category. TAX for the high-income 
group is 0.05 points higher than that of the low-income group. Further, it is 
statistically different at the 1 percent level. This implies that, in comparison with 
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people with low-income, people with high-income perceive income tax as higher. 
Values for NORM and SC for the high-income group are lower than the low-income 
group and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This can be interpreted as 
stating that people belonging to the high-income group are less likely to live in 
areas where neighbors prefer income redistribution and actively participate in 
community events. The higher TAX is, the lower NORM and SC are. All in all, Table 
2 suggests NORM and SC are negatively associated with TAX.  
 
3.3. Econometric Framework and Estimation Strategy 
In Figures 4(a), 4(b), and 4(c), the vertical axis shows the average TAX within a 
prefecture. The horizontal line shows NORM in each prefecture. Figure 4(a) shows 
the relationship between TAX and NORM, based on the whole sample. The 
relationship for the low-income group is demonstrated in Figure 4(b), while the 
relationship for the high-income group is shown in Figure 4(c). A cursory 
examination of Figure 4(a) shows that TAX is not obviously associated with NORM. 
For the low-income group, as in Figure 4(b), TAX is positively associated with 
NORM. In contrast, for the high-income group, as shown in Figure 4(c), TAX is 
negatively associated with NORM. This is consistent with Hypothesis 1. However, 
this relationship is observed when other factors are not controlled for. Hence, a 
more precise examination of the relationship is required via regression analysis 
using individual-level data matched with characteristics from residential areas.  
For the purpose of examining the hypotheses previously proposed, the estimated 
function of the baseline model takes the following form: 
 
TAX im = 0 + 1 NORM m* SC m + 2 NORM m+ 3SC m + 4AVINCOMm + 
5INCOMim + 6AGEim + 7MARRYim + 8SCHOOLim + 9UNEMPim + 
10MALEim + 11PROG_2im + 12PROG_3im + 13PROG_4im + 14PROG_5im + 
uim, 
where TAZim represents the dependent variable in individual i and prefecture m. 
Regression parameters are represented by . As explained earlier, values for TAZim 
range from 1 (too low) to 5 (too high). In this case, a multinomial response is an 
ordered response. Hence, the ordered probit model is appropriate to conduct the 
estimations (Greene 2008, 831–835). The error term is represented by uim. It is 
reasonable to assume that the observations may be spatially correlated within a 
prefecture, as the preference of one agent may well relate to the preference of 
another in the same prefecture. To consider such spatial correlation in line with this 
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assumption, I used the Stata cluster command and calculated z-statistics using 
robust standard errors. The advantage of this approach is that the magnitude of the 
spatial correlation can be unique to each prefecture.  
As explained earlier, in prior research, social norms have been measured looking 
at individuals’ evaluations of social situations (Wenzel, 2004; 2005a). Therefore, 
endogeneity bias can occur because such a measure is endogenously determined. To 
alleviate this bias, the rate of those who support redistribution policies is used as a 
social norm in this paper. From Hypothesis 1, NORM is anticipated to take the 
negative sign when a sample of rich people is used. Furthermore, it seems plausible 
that people who are content with life and economic conditions are more likely to 
have contact with their neighbors. If this holds true, those who are content and 
perceive tax as low are more inclined to have contact with neighbors. Hence, the 
causality between socialization and the perceived tax burden is ambiguous. To 
alleviate this bias, in this paper, I examine the effect of social capital formed in 
residential areas rather than an individual’s socialization. From Hypothesis 2, 
NORM*SC is predicted to take the negative sign. 
AVINCOM is included to control for relative income within a prefecture. As 
suggested by Luttmer (2005), increases in average income within a locality lead to 
reductions in residents’ welfare. Accordingly, people feel unhappier when the 
average income increases. People are thought to perceive tax as high. In this paper, 
for poor people, AVINCOM is expected to take the positive sign. However, an 
increase in AVINCOM appears to lead people to expect that they can earn more. If 
this is so, the sign for AVINCOM becomes negative.  
Following previous research concerning redistribution (e.g., Ravallian and 
Lokshin, 2000; Corneo and and Gruüner, 2002; Ohtake and Tomioka 2004; Alesina 
and La Ferrara 2005; Rainer and Seidler, 2008; Alesina and Giuliano 2009; 
Yamamura 2012), INCOME, AGE, MARRY, SCHOOL, UNEMP, and MALE are 
incorporated as independent variables to control for individual characteristics. 
Political ideology plausibly influences preferences for redistribution. It is important 
to control for this ideology when preferences for income redistribution are estimated 
(Bernasconi 2006; Alesina Giuliano 2009). Hence, perceptions about tax burdens 
seem to be influenced by political ideology. This is captured by PROG_2–PROG_5, 
with PROG_1 (conservative view), as reference groups.  
 
4. Estimation Results 
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Tables 3(a), (b), 4(a), and (b) present the estimation results of the ordered probit 
model. The results of the baseline model, which does not include the interaction 
term between NORM and SC, are reported in Tables 3(a) and (b). Tables 4(a) and (b) 
show the results when the interaction term between NORM and SC is included. In 
each table, the estimation results, based on a sample containing rich and poor 
respondents, are shown in columns (1) and (4) of Tables 3(a) and 4(a). For the 
purpose of comparing factors determining TAX between high-income and 
low-income groups, the sample is divided into high-income and low-income groups. 
The results for the high-income group are presented in columns (2) and (5) of Tables 
3(a) and 4(a) and in columns (1) and (3) of Tables 3(b) and 4(b). The results for the 
low-income group are presented in columns (3) and (6) of Tables 3(a) and 4(a) and in 
columns (2) and (4) of Tables 3(b) and 4(b).  
As pointed out by Luttmer (2005), there is “the possibility that cross-section 
results are driven by selection of people who are happier by nature into areas that 
are relatively poor…One might worry that movers may have had something 
unobserved happen to them” (Luttmer 2005, 977). This unobserved factor can cause 
estimation bias. The JGSS provided data regarding not only current residential 
prefectures but also the residential prefectures of respondents at 15 years of age. If 
the current residential prefecture is not the same as the prefecture at 15 years old, 
respondents are considered to be “movers”. To alleviate this bias, following Luttmer 
(2005) and Yamamura (2012), I also conducted estimations by excluding all 
respondents who had moved to a different prefecture. These results are exhibited in 
columns (4)–(6) of Tables 3(a) and 4(a), and in columns (3) and (4) in Tables 3(b) and 
4(b).  
I see from Table 3(a) that the signs for NORM have the expected negative sign 
for results based on the whole sample and the high-income group sample. 
Furthermore, as presented in columns (2) and (5), it is statistically significant at the 
1 percent level for high-income group. In contrast, in columns (3) and (6), the sign of 
NORM is positive although not statistically significant for the low-income group. 
The coefficients exhibited in Table 3(a) cannot be interpreted as marginal effects 
and it is difficult to interpret them in the ordered probit model. Hence, to determine 
economic significance, I see a marginal effect of NORM. The values for TAX range 
between 1 and 5 and so the marginal effect of NORM varies according to values of 
TAX10 (Greene 2008, 831–835). In the third line from bottom, Tables 3(a) and (b) 
                                                   
10 The marginal effects of NORM can be calculated for each value of TAX; that is, the 
marginal effect of NORM on the probability that TAX is 5, the marginal effect of NORM 
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show the marginal effect of NORM on the probability that the value of TAX is 5 
(perceive tax burden as being “too high”). In columns (2) and (4), the absolute values 
of the marginal effect of NORM are 0.40 and 0.42, respectively. Further, they are 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This can be interpreted as a 1 percent 
increase in those who support redistribution policies within a residential area leads 
to a 0.40 percent decrease in the probability that high-income people perceive their 
tax burden as “too high”. These results are in line with Hypothesis 1.  
Concerning AVINCOM, the higher their neighbors’ income, the less satisfied 
people become. If their neighbors have high levels of income, then people perceive 
tax as high. In contrast, poor people expect that they can earn more if their 
neighbors have higher levels of income. Hence, people perceive the tax as low. The 
former effect is neutralized by the latter, and so AVINCOM is not statistically 
significant for whole sample and the low-income group sample. For the high-income 
group, AVINCOM has the negative sign and is statistically significant at the 1 
percent level. The reason seems to be that the latter effect is distinctly greater than 
the former.  
As for individual characteristics reported in Table 3(a), the sign for INCOME is 
positive for whole sample and the high-income group sample, whereas it is negative 
for the low-income group sample. With the exception of column (3), it is statistically 
significant. This is consistent with the assumption that high-income people are 
more inclined to perceive the tax burden as high as income tax is progressive. A 
significant negative sign for SCHOOL is observed in all estimations. It is 
statistically significant for whole sample and the low-income group sample. People 
with higher education are more likely to expect higher future earnings even if they 
are currently poor. The income tax burden for the low-income group is smaller than 
the high-income group when income tax is progressive. Hence, the results for 
SCHOOL can be interpreted as suggesting that there is high probability that higher 
educated poor people will become rich in the future, and therefore poor people will 
perceive the tax burden as low. PROG_3, PROG_4 and PROG_5 have the positive 
sign and are statistically significant in all estimations. In my interpretation, these 
results imply that more progressive people are less likely to trust the government 
and so feel that tax is not effectively used. As a consequence, the tax burden is 
perceived to be higher than the benefit from tax, leading progressive people to 
                                                                                                                                                     
on the probability that TAX is 4, the marginal effect of NORM on the probability that 
TAX is 3, the marginal effect of NORM on the probability that TAX is 2, and the 
marginal effect of NORM on the probability that TAX is 1. 
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perceive tax as high. However, the assumption that progressive people are less 
likely to the trust government is open to discussion. A closer examination of this 
assumption is beyond the scope of this paper and so should be explored in future 
research. 
Results reported in Table 3(b) are similar to those in Table 3(a). This leads me 
argue that those who consider themselves as high-income earners are more likely to 
perceive their tax as low if neighbors are more likely to prefer redistribution when 
the alternative subjective category regarding high-income people is used. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 1 is strongly supported.  
Turning now to Table 4 (a), I focus on NORM*SC, which is the key variable to 
test Hypothesis 2 because the results of the other control variables are similar to 
those exhibited in Table 3(a). As exhibited in columns (1), (2), (4) and (5), NORM*SC 
yields the negative sign for all samples and the high-income sample. Further, for 
the high-income sample, it is statistically significant. In contrast, NORM*SC 
produces the positive sign for the low-income sample although it is not statistically 
significant. That is, the effect of NORM becomes greater when there is a greater 
accumulation of social capital within a residential area through participation in 
community activities. Furthermore, as presented in columns (2) and (5), the 
marginal effect of SC takes the negative sign and is statistically significant and its 
absolute values are 0.31 and 0.38. This suggests that a 1 percentage point increase 
in the rate that neighbors participate in community activities leads to a 0.31–0.38 
percentage point decrease regarding the perception of high-income people that their 
tax burden is “too high”. This is consistent with Yamamura (2012), who found that 
social capital leads rich people to prefer redistribution policies. The results of Table 
4(b), based on an alternative category regarding high- and low-income groups, are 
almost identical to those of Table 4(a). Considering Tables 4(a) and (b) together 
leads me to assert that the effect of NORM for rich people is strengthen by SC and 
so Hypothesis 2 is strongly supported.  
To sum the various estimated results presented thus far, I conclude, as a whole, 
that the estimation results examined in this section are consistent with Hypotheses 
1 and 2, and hence support them reasonably well. The above findings imply that the 
norm for redistribution within a residential area leads rich people to agree with 
higher tax rates even if income tax is progressive. Further, that effect of the norm is 
strengthened by social capital formed by neighbors. This is congruent with findings 
from the United States, where rich people are more likely to increase charitable 
contributions for inequality reduction than poor people (Derin-Güre and Uler 2010). 
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These results imply that, for rich people, there are negative externalities caused by 
neighbors when rich people act against the norm. In contrast, poor people’s 
perceptions about income tax are unlikely to depend on the norm.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Income tax in Japan is progressive: the higher the income, the greater the tax. 
That is, the net benefit from tax is smaller for the wealthy than the poor. It seems 
appropriate that the wealthy are likely to perceive the tax as high if their 
perceptions about tax burdens are determined by self-interest. In this paper, I 
suggest another possibility: the norm for redistribution leads the wealthy to 
perceive their tax burden as low even if the individual is not altruistic and acts in 
their own self-interest. However, to date no empirical research has attempted to 
examine this possibility.  
This paper explores how the perceived tax burden is influenced by the degree 
that neighbors prefer income redistribution. Further, this paper investigates how 
the influence of neighbors is affected by social capital measured as the degree of 
neighbors’ involvement in community activities; individual-level data and place of 
residence data were combined to determine this effect. After controlling for 
individual characteristics, I obtained the following key findings: the norm for 
redistribution leads rich people to consider the tax burden as low. Further, the effect 
of the norm increases when there is a greater accumulation of social capital within a 
residential area. That is, one’s perceived burden of tax is influenced by psychological 
externalities through interactions in the community. Existing research suggests 
that rich people are more likely to prefer income redistribution in areas where there 
are higher rates of community participation (Yamamura 2012). However, 
psychological externalities vary according to the type of norms within a community. 
That is, in the condition that neighbors are unlikely to prefer redistribution, the 
psychological cost to rich people to oppose redistribution is small. The findings of 
this paper imply that the norm plays a central role in affecting perceptions 
regarding tax burdens. The effects of the norm within a community decrease when 
relationships within the community are weak, even though neighbors prefer 
redistribution. This is in line with the argument in Baron (2010) that 
socio-economic distance influences the degree of enforcement of altruistic moral 
preferences.  
This paper used survey data and hence the cost of giving a response is very low. 
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Accordingly, survey responses can be considered as “expressive”. According to the 
expressing voter hypothesis, individuals vote because they are expressing their 
opinions regarding particular issues, and not because they expect to alter the 
outcomes of the election (e.g., Tullock, 1971; Copeland and Laband, 2002; Sobel and 
Wagner, 2004). The results of this paper can be interpreted as suggesting that 
“pleasing others has a basis in wishing to be liked or popular, which can be achieved 
by expressively signaling conformity with group-defined norms” (Hillman, 2010, 
404). It is difficult to identify the reasons behind the results of this paper. Hence, 
experimental analysis should be conducted to determine whether the results can be 
explain by expressive behavior or psychological externalities. 
The effect of the residential area characteristics seems to differ according to 
individual characteristics. That is, even if individuals live in tight-knit communities 
with high levels of of social capital, their preferences are not necessarily influenced 
their neighbors if they do not socialize in the neighborhood. A lack of data prevents 
a more detailer exploration of this issue. In addition, Japan is generally 
characterized as a racially homogenous society. Japan’s historical and cultural 
condition is different from Western countries. The influence of social capital is 
thought to depend on institutional strength (Ahlerup et al., 2009). Hence, when 
testing the generality of the findings provided in this paper, it is necessary to 
examine the hypotheses proposed here using other countries with different 
historical and cultural background.  
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Figure 1. Distribution of views regarding perceived tax burden  
Note: Respondents were asked: “Do you think the amount of income tax you 
have to pay is high?” 
There were five response options: “1 (too low)”, “2 (somewhat low)”, “3 (about 
right)” “4 (somewhat high)”, “5 (too high)”. 
The number indicated in the figure is equivalent to the number of responses.  
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Figure 2. Distribution of household income 
Note: One unit is equal to one million yen. 
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Figure 3. Distribution of subjective income position 
Note: “Far below average (1)”, “Below average (2)”, “Average (3)”, “Above average (4)”, 
and “Far above average (5)”. 
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Figure 4(a). Relationship between the norm for redistribution and perceived tax burden 
for all categories of income level 
 
  
Figure 4(b). Relationship between the norm for redistribution and perceived tax burden 
for low-income level group (annual household income is lower than 6 million yen) 
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Figure 4(c). Relationship between the norm for redistribution and perceived tax burden 
for high-income level group (annual household income is higher than 6 million yen) 
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     Table 1 
Mean values for high-income household group and low-income household group  
 Definitions Mean Standard 
deviation 
maximum minimum 
Regional 
characteristics 
     
NORM Average value of agreeing with redistribution 
policies within a prefecture. The definition of the 
value is as below: 
Degree of agreement with the argument that the 
government should reduce income inequality: 
1 (strongly disagree)–5 (strongly agree) 
3.71 0.09 3.95 3.53 
SC Rate of those who actively participate in 
community events 
0.47 0.06 0.60 0.37 
AVINCOM Average household income within a prefecture 
(million yen) 
6.12 0.82 7.99 3.52 
Individual 
characteristics 
     
TAX Index of perceived tax burden  4.24 0.83 5 1 
INCOME Individual household income 
(million yen) 
6.11 4.17 23 0 
AGE Age 52.0 16.6 89 20 
MARRY Takes 1 if respondents are currently married, 
otherwise 0 
0.78 -- 1 0 
SCHOOL 
 
Years of schooling 12.1 2.62 18 6 
UNEMP Takes 1 if respondents are currently unemployed, 
otherwise 0 
0.01 -- 1 0 
MALE Takes 1 if respondents are male, otherwise 0 0.45 -- 1 0 
PROG_1 Concerning political views, takes 1 if 
respondents choose 1, otherwise 0 
1 (conservative)–5 (progressive) 
0.07 -- 1 0 
PROG_2 Concerning political views, takes 1 if 
respondents choose 2, otherwise 0 
1 (conservative)–5 (progressive) 
0.20 -- 1 0 
PROG_3 Concerning political views, takes 1 if 
respondents choose 3, otherwise 0 
1 (conservative)–5 (progressive) 
0.52 -- 1 0 
PROG_4 Concerning political views, takes 1 if 
respondents choose 4, otherwise 0 
1 (conservative)–5 (progressive) 
0.16 -- 1 0 
PROG_5 Concerning political views, takes 1 if 0.03 -- 1 0 
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 respondents choose 5, otherwise 0 
1 (conservative)–5 (progressive) 
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     Table 2 
Comparison of TAX, NORM, and SC between high-income household group and 
low-income household group  
 High-income Low-income t-statistics 
TAX 4.25 4.20 2.63*** 
NORM 3.69 3.71 14.2*** 
SC      0.46       0.47 10.7*** 
Note: Respondents whose annual household income is higher than 6 million yen are 
classified as the high-income group. Respondents whose annual household income (or 
equivalent to) lower than 6 million yen are classified as the low-income group. All 
observations were used. Absolute values of t-statistics are the results of a mean difference test 
between high- and low-income household groups. *** indicates significance at the 1% level.  
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Table 3(a) Baseline model: dependent variable is TAX (ordered probit model): each group is 
categorized based on an objective measure (annual household income) 
 All   People live in the same prefecture they lived in at 
15 years of age 
 (1) 
All 
(2) 
High-income 
(3) 
Low-income 
 (4)  
All 
(5) 
High-income 
  (6) 
Low-income 
Regional 
characteristics 
       
NORM   –0.31 
  (–1.60) 
  –1.03*** 
  (–3.63) 
   0.27 
   (1.20) 
   –0.35* 
  (–1.65) 
  –1.08*** 
  (–3.53) 
   0.23 
   (0.89) 
AVINCOM –0.02 
(–1.11) 
–0.09*** 
(–2.83) 
0.04 
(1.52) 
 –0.03 
(–1.33) 
–0.11*** 
(–3.11) 
0.03 
(1.17) 
Individual 
characteristics 
       
INCOME 0.01*** 
(2.97) 
0.01*** 
(3.57) 
–0.01 
(–1.30) 
 0.01* 
(1.69) 
0.01*** 
(3.43) 
–0.02* 
(–1.68) 
AGE  –0.004*** 
(–3.77) 
 0.0001 
(0.04) 
–0.007*** 
(–6.09) 
 –0.003*** 
(–2.60) 
  0.0003 
(0.17) 
–0.006*** 
(–4.09) 
MARRY   0.04 
  (1.42) 
  0.10 
  (1.51) 
0.04 
(1.15) 
  0.06* 
  (1.81) 
  0.07 
  (1.12) 
0.07* 
(1.85) 
SCHOOL 
 
  –0.02*** 
  (–3.44) 
  –0.001 
  (–0.23) 
–0.03*** 
(–3.83) 
  –0.02*** 
  (–2.84) 
  –0.005 
  (–0.59) 
–0.02*** 
(–2.63) 
UNEMP 0.04 
(0.35) 
–0.23 
(–1.14) 
0.13 
(1.19) 
 0.03 
(0.30) 
–0.23 
(–0.97) 
0.11 
(0.88) 
MALE   0.02 
  (0.66) 
  0.01 
  (0.26) 
0.02 
(0.73) 
  0.01 
  (0.34) 
  –0.03 
  (–0.71) 
0.04 
(1.02) 
PROG_1 <Reference group>                             <Reference group> 
PROG_2   –0.01 
  (–0.17) 
   0.03 
  (0.37) 
–0.01 
(–0.20) 
  –0.01 
  (–0.16) 
  –0.01 
  (–0.11) 
0.06 
(0.07) 
PROG_3 0.18*** 
  (3.81) 
0.22*** 
  (2.61) 
0.18*** 
(2.91) 
 0.21*** 
  (3.75) 
0.19** 
  (2.20) 
0.22*** 
(3.32) 
PROG_4 0.17*** 
(3.44) 
0.20** 
(2.41) 
0.16** 
(2.44) 
 0.18*** 
(2.65) 
0.18* 
(1.89) 
0.19** 
(2.22) 
PROG_5    0.52*** 
  (5.03) 
   0.76*** 
  (4.13) 
0.37*** 
(3.57) 
   0.52*** 
  (4.86) 
   0.74*** 
  (4.19) 
0.39*** 
(3.12) 
Marginal effect  
NORM 
–0.12 
(–1.60) 
–0.40*** 
(–3.66) 
0.10 
(1.20) 
 –0.14* 
(–1.66) 
–0.42*** 
(–3.57) 
0.09 
(0.89) 
Wald Statistics 164   120      117  188     96 152 
Observations   7794   3512 4282   5606   2479 3127 
Note: Respondents whose annual household income is higher than 6 million yen are 
classified as the high-income group. Respondents whose annual household income is 
lower than (or equivalent to) 6 million yen are classified as the low-income group. 
Values in each variable are coefficients. In the third line from the bottom, the 
marginal effect of NORM on the probability that TAX is 5 is reported. Numbers in 
parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered in the 
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prefecture. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. In all estimations, year dummies are included as independent variables 
but are not reported because of space limitations.  
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Table 3(b) Dependent variable is TAX (ordered probit model): each group is categorized based on a 
subjective measure 
 All   People live in the same prefecture 
they lived in at 15 years of age 
 (1) 
High-income 
(2) 
Low-income 
 (3) 
High-income 
  (4) 
Low-income 
Regional 
characteristics 
     
NORM   –0.93** 
  (–2.52) 
   0.03 
   (0.16) 
   –1.05** 
  (–2.15) 
   0.10 
   (0.43) 
AVINCOM –0.07* 
(–1.96) 
0.003 
(0.12) 
 –0.13** 
(–2.53) 
–0.01 
(–0.16) 
Individual 
characteristics 
     
INCOME 0.01*** 
(2.80) 
–0.004 
(–0.52) 
 0.02** 
(2.56) 
–0.01 
(–0.98) 
AGE  –0.001 
(–0.61) 
–0.003** 
(–2.54) 
  –0.001 
(–0.21) 
–0.002 
(–1.28) 
MARRY   0.02 
  (0.22) 
0.11** 
(2.27) 
   0.01 
  (0.11) 
0.16*** 
(3.09) 
SCHOOL 
 
  –0.01 
  (–0.29) 
–0.02*** 
(–3.01) 
   –0.01** 
  (–0.35) 
–0.01 
(–1.23) 
UNEMP –0.17 
(–0.38) 
0.30** 
(2.03) 
 –0.10 
(–0.16) 
0.19 
(1.24) 
MALE   0.02 
  (0.39) 
0.01 
(0.34) 
    0.05 
  (0.70) 
–0.01 
(–0.15) 
PROG_1 <Reference group>                <Reference group> 
PROG_2    0.08 
  (0.67) 
0.02 
(0.28) 
   –0.04 
  (–0.31) 
0.08 
(0.84) 
PROG_3 0.23* 
  (1.78) 
0.24*** 
(3.17) 
 0.18 
  (1.32) 
0.31*** 
(3.67) 
PROG_4 0.24** 
(2.11) 
0.19** 
(2.38) 
 0.20 
(1.40) 
0.21** 
(2.30) 
PROG_5    0.40** 
  (2.31) 
0.51*** 
(4.33) 
    0.25 
  (0.96) 
0.56*** 
(4.08) 
Marginal effect  
NORM 
–0.36** 
(–2.53) 
0.01 
(0.16) 
 –0.40** 
(–2.14) 
0.04 
(0.43) 
Wald statistics    80    101     76   79 
Observations   1197 3135    784 2280 
Note: Respondents who considered themselves above or far above average income 
earners are classified as the high-income group. Respondents who considered 
themselves below or far below average income earners are classified as the low-income 
group. Respondents who considered themselves as average earners are included in the 
estimations in columns (1) and (4) in Table 3(a), but excluded from the sample in Table 
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3(b). Values in each variable are coefficients. In the third line from the bottom, the 
marginal effect of NORM on the probability that TAX is 5 is reported. Numbers in 
parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered in the 
prefecture. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. In all estimations, year dummies are included as independent variables 
but are not reported because of space limitations.  
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Table 4(a) Baseline model: dependent variable is TAX (ordered probit model): each group is 
categorized based on objective measure (annual household income) 
 All   People live in the same prefecture they lived in at 
15 years of age 
 (1) 
All 
(2) 
High-income 
(3) 
Low-income 
 (4)  
All 
(5) 
High-income 
  (6) 
Low-income 
Regional 
characteristics 
       
NORM*SC –0.69 
(–0.36) 
–5.03* 
(–1.95) 
0.86 
(0.30) 
 –0.74 
(–0.34) 
–5.45* 
(–1.72) 
0.92 
(0.27) 
NORM   0.10 
  (0.10) 
  1.66 
  (1.22) 
  –0.17 
  (–0.12) 
   0.09 
  (0.08) 
  1.87 
  (1.11) 
  –0.25 
  (–0.14) 
SC 2.23 
(0.31) 
17.9* 
(1.90) 
–3.07 
(–0.29) 
 2.33 
(0.29) 
19.2* 
(1.65) 
–3.34 
(–0.26) 
AVINCOM –0.03 
(–1.30) 
–0.10*** 
(–3.34) 
0.04 
(1.38) 
 –0.04 
(–1.46) 
–0.12*** 
(–3.63) 
0.03 
(1.09) 
Individual 
characteristics 
       
INCOME 0.01*** 
(3.01) 
0.01*** 
(3.57) 
–0.01 
(–1.30) 
 0.01* 
(1.72) 
0.02*** 
(3.40) 
–0.02* 
(–1.69) 
AGE  –0.004*** 
(–3.68) 
 0.0002 
(0.09) 
–0.007*** 
(–6.05) 
 –0.003** 
(–2.49) 
  0.0005 
(0.23) 
–0.006*** 
(–4.07) 
MARRY   0.04 
  (1.46) 
  0.10 
  (1.56) 
0.04 
(1.15) 
  0.06* 
  (1.88) 
  0.07 
  (1.20) 
0.07* 
(1.85) 
SCHOOL 
 
  –0.02*** 
  (–3.49) 
  –0.002 
  (–0.28) 
–0.03*** 
(–3.80) 
  –0.02*** 
  (–2.87) 
  –0.005 
  (–0.61) 
–0.02*** 
(–2.64) 
UNEMP 0.03 
(0.33) 
–0.24 
(–1.19) 
0.13 
(1.18) 
 0.03 
(0.27) 
–0.24 
(–1.02) 
0.11 
(0.87) 
MALE   0.02 
  (0.67) 
  0.01 
  (0.28) 
0.02 
(0.74) 
  0.01 
  (0.34) 
  –0.03 
  (–0.73) 
0.04 
(1.02) 
PROG_1 <Reference group>                             <Reference group> 
PROG_2   –0.01 
  (–0.15) 
   0.03 
  (0.40) 
–0.01 
(–0.20) 
  –0.01 
  (–0.15) 
  –0.004 
  (–0.05) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
PROG_3 0.18*** 
  (3.76) 
0.22*** 
  (2.62) 
0.18*** 
(2.91) 
 0.20*** 
  (3.70) 
0.20** 
  (2.26) 
0.22*** 
(3.31) 
PROG_4 0.17*** 
(3.42) 
0.20** 
(2.42) 
0.16** 
(2.44) 
 0.18*** 
(2.63) 
0.18* 
(1.92) 
0.19** 
(2.22) 
PROG_5    0.52*** 
  (5.02) 
   0.77*** 
  (4.12) 
0.37*** 
(3.59) 
   0.52*** 
  (4.84) 
   0.74*** 
  (4.16) 
0.39*** 
(3.15) 
Marginal effect  
NORM 
–0.08 
(–1.08) 
–0.26** 
(–2.21) 
0.09 
(0.89) 
 –0.10 
(–1.19) 
–0.28** 
(–2.22) 
0.07 
(0.65) 
Marginal effect  
SC 
–0.13 
(–1.39) 
–0.31** 
(–2.29) 
0.04 
(0.35) 
 –0.17 
(–1.27) 
–0.38** 
(–2.39) 
0.03 
(0.20) 
Wald Statistics 292   133      171  274     98 169 
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Observations   7794   3512 4282   5606   2479 3127 
Note: Respondents whose annual household income is higher than 6 million yen are 
classified as the high-income group. Respondents whose annual household income is 
lower than (or equivalent to) 6 million yen are classified as the low-income group. 
Values are coefficients in each variable. In the third line from the bottom, the marginal 
effects of NORM and SC on the probability that TAX is 5 are reported. Numbers in 
parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered in the 
prefecture. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. In all estimations, year dummies are included as independent variables 
but are not reported because of space limitations.  
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Table 4(b) Dependent variable is TAX (ordered probit model): each group is categorized based on 
subjective measure. 
 All   People live in the same prefecture 
they lived in at 15 years of age. 
 (1) 
High-income 
(2) 
Low-income 
 (3) 
High-income 
  (4) 
Low-income 
Regional 
characteristics 
     
NORM*SC –8.49** 
(–0.24) 
1.51 
(0.56) 
 –11.2* 
(–1.91) 
1.39 
(0.51) 
NORM   3.33* 
  (1.79) 
  –0.71 
  (–0.50) 
   4.59 
  (1.52) 
  –0.57 
  (–0.40) 
SC 31.4** 
(2.22) 
–5.74 
(–0.57) 
 41.8* 
(1.91) 
–5.44 
(–0.54) 
AVINCOM –0.06 
(–1.39) 
–0.002 
(–0.08) 
 –0.10* 
(–1.83) 
–0.01 
(–0.36) 
Individual 
characteristics 
     
INCOME 0.01*** 
(2.76) 
–0.004 
(–0.50) 
 0.02** 
(2.55) 
–0.01 
(–0.95) 
AGE  –0.001 
(–0.60) 
–0.003** 
(–2.52) 
  –0.001 
(–0.25) 
–0.002 
(–1.25) 
MARRY   0.02 
  (0.27) 
0.12** 
(2.31) 
   0.01 
  (0.15) 
0.16*** 
(3.13) 
SCHOOL 
 
  –0.003 
  (–0.19) 
–0.02*** 
(–3.06) 
   –0.004 
  (–0.23) 
–0.01 
(–1.27) 
UNEMP –0.17 
(–0.36) 
0.29** 
(2.01) 
 –0.09 
(–0.14) 
0.19 
(1.21) 
MALE   0.02 
  (0.27) 
0.01 
(0.35) 
    0.04 
  (0.49) 
–0.01 
(–0.15) 
PROG_1 <Reference group>                <Reference group> 
PROG_2    0.07 
  (0.59) 
0.02 
(0.30) 
   –0.05 
  (–0.35) 
0.08 
(0.86) 
PROG_3 0.22* 
  (1.69) 
0.24*** 
(3.17) 
 0.17 
  (1.24) 
0.31*** 
(3.65) 
PROG_4 0.23* 
(1.97) 
0.19** 
(2.38) 
 0.18 
(1.26) 
0.21** 
(2.32) 
PROG_5    0.40** 
  (2.28) 
0.51*** 
(4.33) 
    0.25 
  (0.95) 
0.56*** 
(4.06) 
Marginal effect  
NORM 
–0.23* 
(–1.65) 
0.002 
(0.02) 
 –0.27 
(–1.41) 
0.03 
(0.38) 
 36 
 
Marginal effect  
SC 
0.02 
(0.11) 
–0.04 
(–0.34) 
 0.07 
(0.32) 
–0.09 
(–0.55) 
Wald statistics    84    102     91   79 
Observations   1197 3135    784 2280 
Note: Respondents who considered themselves above or far above average income 
earners are classified as the high-income group. Respondents who considered 
themselves below or far below average income earners are classified as the low-income 
group. Respondents who considered themselves as average earners are included in the 
estimations of columns (1) and (4) in Table 3(a), but excluded from the sample in Table 
3(b). Numbers indicate marginal effect. Values are coefficients in each variable. In the 
third line from the bottom, marginal effects of NORM and SC on the probability that 
TAX is 5 are reported. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust 
standard errors clustered in the prefecture. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. In all estimations, year dummies are included as 
independent variables but are not reported because of space limitations.  
 
 
 
